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DRED AGAIN: ORIGINALISM'S 
FORGOTTEN PAST 
Christopher L. Eisgruber* 
I. DRED AGAIN? 
Justice Scalia closes his dissent in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 1 by announcing the Dorian 
Gray Theory of Constitutional Jurisprudence.2 Scalia observes that 
Roger Taney's portrait at Harvard looks downcast, even gloomy. 
The Justice has an explanation: "those of us who know how the 
lustre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred 
Scott cannot help believing that he had that case-its already appar-
ent consequences for the Court, and its soon-to-be-played-out con-
sequences for the Nation-burning on his mind."3 The 
jurisprudential sins of judges are, apparently, visited on their por-
traits.4 Scalia's story has a moral: the Casey majority should fear 
for its portraits, because Casey is, simply put, Dred Again.s 
I am no art critic, and would not dare to challenge Scalia's 
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I. -U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 60 U.S.L.W. 4795 (1992). 
2. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (Penguin, 1985). 
3. 112 S. Ct. at 2885, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4842. Scalia's reference is to Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The official report of the case misspelled the defendant's 
last name, Sanford. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, Its Significance in American 
Law and Politics 2 n.• (Oxford U. Press, 1978). In this essay, I will use "Sanford" when 
referring to the defendant and "Sandford" when referring to the case. 
4. Scalia imagines a causal mechanism less fantastic than Wilde's. Compare Casey, 
112 S. Ct. at 2885, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4842 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (portrait painted after blame-
worthy acts reveals their effects upon the actor) with Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 118-
91 (cited in note 2) (portrait painted before blameworthy acts reveals their effects upon the 
actor). 
5. Scalia says that the Taney of Scott v. Sandford, like the Casey plurality, had thought 
that his opinion called a divided nation to " 'accept[ ) a common mandate rooted in the 
Constitution,'" and the Justices do "neither [themselves) nor the country any good by re-
maining" arbiters of the abortion controversy. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4842 
(Scalia, J. dissenting), quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4804 (opinion of 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter). 
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interpretation of Taney's portrait. Nor am I inclined to contest 
Scalia's theory of Taney's psyche, or his praise for the "lustre" of 
Taney's pre-Scott record (although Taney's "dual federalism"6 wins 
no plaudits in this comer). I care enough about the Constitution, 
however, to contest Justice Scalia's mistaken comparison of Casey 
and Scott. While I doubt that the "Dorian Gray Theory of Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence" will attract many adherents, the "Dred 
Again" theory is getting enough air time that it makes sense to de-
bunk some popular myths about Scott. 
The "Dred Again" theory goes like this: 
'[Scott] was at least possibly the first application of substantive 
due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for 
Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade.' .... Lochner and Roe 
have, therefore, a very ugly common ancestor. But once it is 
conceded that a judge may give the due process clause substan-
tive content, Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe are equally valid ex-
amples of constitutional law ..... Who says Roe must say 
Lochner and Scott. 7 
That is Judge Robert Bark's statement of the theory.s His conclu-
sion is, of course, a blatant non-sequitur.9 Nevertheless, although 
most proponents of the "Dred Again" theory phrase their claims 
more modestly than he does, Bork is only one among many scholars 
and jurists to make similar claims about Roe and Scott. The first 
sentence in the quoted passage comes from Professor David Cur-
rie. 10 Professor Michael McConnell has made a "Dred Again" ar-
gument roughly parallel to Bork's.u This theory is, moreover, the 
premise for Justice Scalia's warning to his colleagues about the fate 
of their images.12 
6. See, e.g., EdwardS. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. I, 15-
16 (1950) (describing Taney's use of state power as an independent limit on national power). 
7. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Free 
Press, 1990) ("The Tempting of America"). 
8. Bork alluded to the argument recently in the New York Times. Robert H. Bork, 
Again, A Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1992, at A19, col. 2. 
9. It would be like saying that because Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. -, 111 
S. Ct. 2456, 59 U.S.L.W. 4745 (1991) (the nude dancing case) refused to uphold a free speech 
claim, and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (subversive speech case) refused to 
uphold a free speech claim, who says Barnes must say Debs. Or that because George Bush is 
a Republican, and David Duke is a Republican, who says Bush must say Duke. 
10. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 
1789-1888 271 (U. of Chi. Press, 1985) ("The Constitution in the Supreme Court"). 
II. Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 89, 101 (1988). 
12. See, e.g., Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4837 (quoting from the Scott dissent); id. at 4841 
(quoting Currie's comparison of Roe and Scott); and id. at 4842 (the Casey plurality calls to 
mind Taney's post-Scott gloom). 
Scalia's invocation of Scott rests in part upon a feature of Casey not related to interpreta-
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About the non-sequitur, I have little to say. I could show at 
length that any theory of constitutional interpretation (for example, 
originalism) can be manipulated to fit the prejudices of a willful 
judge. I could then add that a perverse application of a theory is 
not a reason to reject the theory.l3 But these arguments are obvi-
ous. No intellectual purpose would be served by pushing the point. 
What disturbs me is the mistaken picture of Scott v. Sandford 
implicit in the "Dred Again" theory. That picture describes a battle 
between, on the one hand, a "fundamental values/substantive due 
process" jurisprudence (Taney, confident of his lustre and not yet 
rendered gloomy by discovery of his mistake)t4 and, on the other 
tion of the Due Process Clause: Scalia takes issue with the plurality's assertion that the Court 
in Roe was "asked" to "call[ ] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their 
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." 112 S. Ct. at 
2885, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4804. There is some reason to believe that in Scott the Justices had a 
similar view about their ability to end controversy. See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, The 
American Supreme Court 96 (of Taney's errors, the "first and greatest had been to imagine 
that a flaming political issue could be quenched by calling it a 'legal' issue and deciding it 
judicially"); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 306 (cited in note 3) (the Justices wrote 
broadly in Scott because they thought that by "acting boldly, the Court might be able to 
dispose of a dangerous public issue and perhaps save the nation from disaster."). 
Yet, Scalia could not have censured the Casey plurality so harshly had he respected the 
plurality's claim that its "mandate" was "rooted in the Constitution." It is one thing to say 
that the plurality is wrong about the Court's capacity to end controversy, and another to say 
that the controversy is reminiscent of Scott's aftermath. There is good reason, for example, to 
believe that the Court was too confident about its ability to end the national controversy 
about integrated schools. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 91 Col. L. Rev. 1867, 1928-30 (1991) (Warren, Frankfurter, and other Justices 
overestimated the Court's ability to achieve gradual, short-term desegregation); see also 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 24-25 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (exhorting state offi-
cials not to resist " 'the supreme Law of the Land,' . . . as declared by the organ of our 
Government for ascertaining it," but instead to help insure that "local habits and feelings will 
yield, gradually ... , to law and education"). Nevertheless, it would be bizarre to suggest that 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated schools are unconstitutional), 
was another Scott v. Sandford. 
Scalia's critique thus depends upon the assertion that the plurality's view on the merits, 
as well as its view of the judiciary's role in the constitutional order, is wrong in ways that 
recall Taney's errors in Scott. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision In the 
Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17 Am. Hist. Rev. 52, 68 (1911)(defending the Scott 
Court's authority to reach the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, but condemning 
the Court for disposing of the issue irresponsibly). Perhaps Scalia is relying on a belief that 
abortion and slavery are comparable moral evils. Scalia does not, however, profess such a 
belief in Casey. The only connection he draws between the merits of Scott and the merits of 
Casey is his claim that Scott is the fountain of substantive due process. 
13. Without speculating upon Taney's motives, I note that Bork describes Taney as a 
"Southern partisan" looking for a chance to "make his resentments and his adherence to the 
cause of the slave states into constitutional law." Bork, The Tempting of America at 29 (cited 
in note 7). 
14. See, e.g., Bork, The Tempting of America at 30 (cited in note 7) (Taney's opinion is 
blameworthy because its use of substantive due process "is as blatant a distortion of the 
original understanding of the Constitution as one can find"); id. at 209 (listing Scott among 
"manifestations of the natural law"). See also McConnell, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 89, 101 
(cited in note II) (Taney apparently concluded "that the prohibition of slavery is in violation 
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hand, a "positivist/original intent/process-means-process" jurispru-
dence (both dissenters, perhaps, but especially Curtis's). "Dred 
Again" next draws a line from Taney to Blackmun, and another 
from Curtis to Rehnquist, Scalia and Bork. 
That account of Scott v. Sandford contains blunders which, to 
anyone who has read the opinion carefully, are as obvious as Bork's 
non-sequitur. Almost nobody, however, has read Scott, much less 
carefully. Perhaps that's an excusable omission. The case covers 
about 250 pages of the United States Reports,'6 and much of it is 
balderdash.17 Nearly all of it is complicated: the case is a snarl of 
jurisdictional, choice of law, and substantive issues.1s The compli-
cations become headier because they require the reader to remem-
ber that axiomatic propositions of modem jurisprudence do not 
apply.19 Add to that the case's lack of doctrinal significance, and 
one can see why so few constitutional law teachers include it in 
of natural right," and so authored the first Supreme Court decision "to take the view that a 
statute can be unconstitutional because it violates unenumerated rights"). 
15. See, e.g., Bork, The Tempting of America at 33 (cited in note 7) ("Justice Benjamin 
Curtis of Massachusetts dissented in Dred Scott, destroyed Taney's reasoning, and rested his 
own conclusions upon the original understanding of those who made the Constitution."). See 
also McConnell, 64 Chi-Kent L. Rev. at 101-02 (cited in note II) (Curtis's dissent was a 
rebuke to unenumerated rights jurisprudence). 
16. All nine Justices wrote opinions. Although the official reporter captions Taney's 
opinion as the "opinion of the court," Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399, it is maddeningly 
difficult to count which Justices joined which propositions, or to construct a "holding" for 
the case. See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 324,404 (cited in note 3) (proposing 
a "box score" for the case). 
17. Justice Daniel's opinion, for example, includes a pompous discussion of Roman 
slavery, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 477-80 (concurring opinion), purporting to shed some light on 
the relationship between emancipation and citizenship in the United States. See Theodore D. 
Woolsey, Opinion of Judge Daniel in the Case of Dred Scott, 15 New Englander 345 (1857) 
(criticizing Daniel's interpretation of Roman law). Cf. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 
400 (cited in note 3) ("Daniel's extremism revealed itself most clearly in the intemperateness 
of his language, which impugned the motives, intelligence, and patriotism of persons support-
ing congressional power over slavery in the territories."). 
18. For example, Scott claimed that he had become free because his master, John Emer-
son, had voluntarily taken Scott with him into the Northwest territories to Fort Snelling in 
Minnesota, where slavery was prohibited by federal statute, and Illinois, where slavery was 
prohibited by state law. Scott and Emerson returned to Missouri before Scott sued for free-
dom. The Court thus confronted a difficult choice-of-law problem: which jurisdiction's law 
(Missouri's, Illinois's, or federal law) governed Scott's status after his return to Missouri? See 
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 94 (1850) (when a person makes a claim to freedom 
predicated upon prior entry into a free state, the claim is governed by the law of the state in 
which the person is resident). For further investigation of these complexities, see Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court at 267-68 n.240 (cited in note 10); Fehrenbacher, The Dred 
Scott Case at 260-62, 385-88 (cited in note 3). 
19. For example, it is Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), not Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that governs the federal court's interpretation of state law, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not around to describe the relationship between personhood 
and citizenship for native-born Americans. 
1993] DREDAGAIN 41 
their syllabi.2o Scott v. Sandford is not only the most unjust deci-
sion the Supreme Court ever rendered, it is also among the longest, 
the murkiest and the most obsolete. 
Nevertheless, on one point I concur with Justice Scalia and the 
other "Dred Again" theorists: we must not forget the worst atroc-
ity in the Supreme Court's history, for we can ill afford a repetition 
of the error. For that reason, the mistakes in the "Dred Again" 
account of Scott matter in a way that Judge Bork's non-sequitur 
does not. In light of its length, few will find time to wade through 
Scott in search of its lessons. So I offer here a brief summary of the 
corrections needed to restore the picture blurred by the "Dred 
Again" theory. 
I begin by briefing the case, and then state five observations 
about its jurisprudential significance. The picture that emerges does 
not threaten the Casey or Roe majorities, but instead carries a warn-
ing for their critics. What separated Taney from the Scott dissent-
ers was not his recourse to fundamental values (for he made none), 
nor his rejection of originalism (for he embraced it). What sepa-
rated Taney from the dissenters was his indifference to justice. 
II. READ AGAIN 
At a general level, Scott is easy to summarize.21 Scott was held 
as a slave in Missouri. Scott's master, John Emerson, voluntarily 
took Scott to, among other places, the Northwest Territories, where 
slavery was prohibited by congressional enactment (specifically, the 
Missouri Compromise). Scott and Emerson eventually returned to 
Missouri.22 Scott claimed thereafter that he had been emancipated 
by, among other things, operation of the Missouri Compromise.23 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Taney's opinion included an argu-
ment that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because 
the federal government lacked authority to regulate slavery in the 
territories.24 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment fig-
20. One leading casebook, for example, mentions Scott only twice, once in connection 
with Lincoln's opposition to it and once to name it as the source of substantive due process. 
Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 23, 445 (Foundation Press, II th ed. 1985). No substan-
tial excerpt from the case appears anywhere in the book. 
21. Readers familiar with the facts, procedural posture, and holding of Dred Scott 
should skip this subsection. On the other hand, those who desire a more complete descrip-
tion should consult Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 239-448 (cited in note 3), or the 
abridged version of that book, Donald G. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law and Politics: The Dred 
Scott Case in Historical Perspective 121-243 (Oxford U. Press, 1981), which offer detailed and 
readable accounts of the case. 
22. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397-98. 
23. Id. at 432. 
24. Id. at 452. 
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ured in the portion of Taney's opinion devoted to the Missouri 
Compromise: Taney implied that it deprived slaveholders who en-
tered the Territories of their property without due process of law.2s 
That's simple enough. Matters become much more compli-
cated when one introduces the procedural posture of the case, and 
attends to the "other things" and "other places" mentioned 
above-which one must do to discover the jurisprudential founda-
tions for Taney's conclusions. I will introduce some of those com-
plications as they become relevant. 
One complication bears immediate notice, however. It pertains 
to jurisdiction. The case is a state law action brought in federal 
court: Scott claimed, in essence, that he had been battered and im-
prisoned,26 and Sanford claimed a right to batter and imprison on 
the ground that Scott was his slave.21 Federal jurisdiction depended 
upon whether the suit fit under the Diversity Clause, which autho-
rizes the federal courts to decide cases "between Citizens of differ-
ent States."2s Sanford, a citizen of New York,29 contested Scott's 
status as a "Citizen" of Missouri, contending that people descended 
from slaves could never be citizens, whether or not they were free.Jo 
The result was a kind of double-dip into the question of Scott's free-
dom: he apparently had to be free to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, and he had to be free to win on the merits under 
Missouri law. On the other hand, even if Scott were free, he might 
not be a Citizen capable of invoking diversity jurisdiction. 
Taney began his opinion with a lengthy argument upholding 
Sanford's jurisdictional plea.Jt Taney held that nobody of African 
descent could ever become a citizen within the meaning of the di-
versity clause, concluding along the way that African-Americans 
were not among the "people" referred to by the Constitution.J2 Af-
ter deciding that the Court lacked jurisdiction, however, Taney 
went on to consider whether Congress had authority to prohibit 
slavery in the territories.JJ This combination of rulings generated a 
long-running debate about whether Taney's pronouncements on the 
Missouri Compromise were dicta.J4 That debate has no bearing 
25. ld. at 450. Taney never did more than imply the inconsistency between due process 
and the Missouri Compromise. See infra note 76. 
26. ld. at 396. 
27. ld. at 397. 
28. U.S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 2, Para. 1. 
29. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
30. I d. at 396-97. 
31. Id. at 399-430. 
32. ld. at 404-05, 411, 426-27. 
33. ld. at 430-54. 
34. For discussion of the debate, see David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis: 1848-
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upon our topic here. What will matter greatly is the nature of Ta-
ney's arguments about jurisdiction (they are originalist) and there-
lation between those arguments and his interpretation of the due 
process clause (the latter depends upon the former). 
III. READ RIGHT 
My first observation, which I owe to a recent article by Justice 
Stevens,Js is that Scott and Casey derive from different textual 
sources. Stevens points out that Roe, Griswold and a variety of 
other cases were decided under the Liberty Clause: the portion of 
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments guaranteeing that no person 
will be deprived of liberty without due process oflaw. Scott v. Sand-
ford was not decided under this clause. It was decided under the 
Property Clause of the Fifth Amendment: the portion guaranteeing 
that no person will be deprived of property without due process of 
law. 
For some, this difference won't be enough to sustain a textual 
distinction. After all, liberty and property stand next to one an-
other in a list ("life, liberty, or property"). The Liberty and Prop-
erty Clauses share the words preceding ("No person shall ... be 
deprived of ... ,"or "nor shall any State deprive any person of ... ") 
and following ("without due process of law") the list. Does the dif-
ference matter? A powerful argument says that it does. 
Liberty is different from property because the definition of lib-
erty flows from human nature and our ideals, not from historical 
accidents like thefts, feoffments and statutes (including, for pur-
poses of Scott, the slave laws). Justice Stevens put the point crisply 
in Meachum v. Fano, when he dissented from the majority's claim 
that a liberty interest must either "originate in the Constitution" or 
have "its roots in state law."36 Stevens said, 
law .... is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive 
source. 
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by 
their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable 
rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause 
protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred 
1861 281-86 (Harper & Row, 1976) ("Impending Crisis"). See also Corwin, 17 Am. Hist. 
Rev. at 52, 53-58 (cited in note 12) (contending that Taney's discussion of the Missouri Com-
promise was an alternative ground for his jurisdictional theory, not an exploration of the 
merits, and so was within the Coun's authority). 
35. John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 
20 (1992). 
36. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the 
majority opinion, id. at 226). 
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by specific laws or regulations.37 
Stevens wasn't the first to suggest that view. His opinion deliber-
ately echoes the Declaration of Independence, which names "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as "unalienable rights." The 
Constitution's Due Process Clause, which (unlike the Declaration) 
treats both natural and positive rights, substitutes "property" for 
the "pursuit of happiness." Even during the heyday of natural law 
thought in American jurisprudence, some theorists recognized that 
the boundaries of property rights depended largely on positive dec-
laration. Joseph Story, for example, finished a survey of theories 
about natural law and property rights by saying, 
Whatever right a man may have to property, it does not follow, 
that he has a right to transfer that right to another, or to transmit 
it, at his decease, to his children, or heirs. The nature and extent 
of his ownership; the modes in which he may dispose of it; the 
course of descent, and distribution of it upon his death; and the 
remedies for the redress of any violation of it, are, in great mea-
sure, if not altogether, the result of the positive institutions of 
society.Js 
Story, of course, spoke the now out-moded language of natural law, 
and some today may find uncomfortable even the Declaration's ref-
erences to a "Creator." One need not use natural rights rhetoric, 
however, to express the basic point: property depends for its defini-
tion upon legislatures in a way that liberty does not. 
The contingent character of property rights is the best reason 
to respect the Constitution's distinction between liberty and prop-
erty when determining whether the due process clause protects sub-
stantive as well as procedural rights. If, however, the "Dred Again" 
theorists were to reject this argument, they would have to explore 
others. Institutional considerations, for example, provide another 
ground for respecting the distinction between liberty and property. 
For the last fifty years, the Court has drawn a line between eco-
nomic regulations and other laws, holding that the judiciary has no 
business closely scrutinizing the former.J9 Insofar as this distinc-
tion depends upon the belief that economic rights are relatively un-
important, it has taken some hard knocks in recent years from 
37. ld. 
38. Story, Natural Law, in Francis Lieber, ed., 9 Encyclopedia Americana 150, 156 
(Desilver, Thomas & Co., 1836). For a more extended discussion of Story's views about 
property and natural law, see Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the 
Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273, 317-19 
(1988). 
39. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 u.s. 483 (1955). 
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critics like Stephen Macedo.40 Many readers may agree with 
Macedo that "(o]ur occupations often shape our identities as deeply 
as what we read or take in through the media, as deeply as the 
intimate choices we make."4I Yet even those who share Macedo's 
views about the importance of economic liberties might nevertheless 
believe that considerations of institutional competence leave the 
Court poorly positioned to protect economic rights: one might, for 
example, think that in a complex market economy it is harder for 
judges (given their training and resources) to assess the impact of 
economic regulations on economic liberties than it is for them to 
assess the impact of moral regulations on personal privacy.42 Those 
who accept such institutional arguments will find in them a reason 
to read the due process clause in a way that treats liberty and prop-
erty differently.•3 
In any event, the "Dred Again" theorists must offer a reasoned 
response to Stevens' textual argument. They cannot dismiss the dis-
tinction between liberty and property by saying, as Bork recently 
did, that "(n]either word has any substantive meaning other than 
what the Court chooses to give it. "44 That position is inconsistent 
not only with Bork's own professed textualism,•s but also with the 
premises of the "Dred Again" argument. The argument turns in 
part upon the claim that Scott and Roe flow from the same set of 
words. They don't. 
40. See Steven Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal 
Constitutionalism 183-202 (Oxford U. Press, 1990) (criticizing the "constitutional double 
standard" that distinguishes property rights from, e.g., privacy rights). 
41. ld. at 198. 
42. Justice Douglas was inclined to use grounds of this sort to justify the Court's refusal 
to review economic legislation. Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 212 n.4 (1973) (the 
Court does not engage in substantive due process when protecting abortion rights because it 
does not implicate "legislation governing a business enterprise") with Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
U.S. 351, 356 n.IO (1974) (the Court would reinstate substantive due process if it used the 
Equal Protection Clause to scrutinize the empirical foundation for a Florida tax break favor-
ing women). 
43. Of course, the Court's deference to economic legislation responded to a series of 
cases premised upon the Liberty Clause, not the Property Clause. See, e.g., Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Morehead v. 
New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). These cases present a problem for people who 
believe that the Court's institutional competence supplies a ground for respecting the distinc-
tion between liberty and property, but who reject the notion that property depends upon 
positive declaration in a way that liberty does not. One solution would be to claim that the 
Court erred by conceptualizing the claims in these cases as liberty claims rather than prop-
erty claims. 
44. Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. Times, July 8, 
1992, at Al9, col. 2. 
45. See, e.g., id. ("The inescapable fact is that the Constitution contains not one word 
that can be tortured into the slightest relevance to abortion, one way or the other"); Bork, 
The Tempting of America at 145 (cited in note 7) ("the judge is to interpret what is in the text, 
and not something else"). 
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My second observation is that Roger Taney was an originalist. 
His opinion in Scott v. Sandford is a riot of originalism. The heart 
of his argument is a lengthy description of racist behavior at the 
time the Constitution was drafted, all of which he uses to argue that 
African-Americans are neither "people" nor "citizens" under the 
Constitution.46 Taney describes his method this way: 
If any of [the Constitution's] provisions are deemed unjust, there 
is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be 
amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed 
now as it was understood at the time of its adoption .... it speaks 
not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and in-
tent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its 
framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the 
United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate 
the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of 
the popular opinion or passion of the day.47 
Here is a credo to warm the hearts of originalists!4s In service 
of this ideal, Taney collected a variety of evidence. He traced the 
export of pro-slavery attitudes from England to the colonies.49 He 
surveyed the various state statutes assigning African-Americans to 
an "inferior and subject condition, "so and claimed that "no example 
... can be found of [the] admission [of any free African-American] 
to all the privileges of citizenship in any State of the Union after 
these Articles were formed, and while they continued in force."st 
He said that the slave states would never have consented to the 
Constitution if it fostered the possibility that their property might 
be confused with persons.s2 Most importantly, Taney maintained 
46. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05. 
47. ld. at 426. 
48. One can, for example, hear echoes of Taney's language in Robert Bork's: 
Statutes, we agree, may be changed by amendment or repeal. The Constitution may 
be changed by amendment pursuant to the procedures set out in article V. It is a 
necessary implication of the prescribed procedures that neither statute nor Consti· 
tution should be changed by judges. Though that has been done often enough, it is 
in no sense proper. 
What is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change? It is the meaning 
understood at the time of the law's enactment. Though I have written of the under-
standing of the ratifiers of the Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, 
that is actually a shorthand formulation, because what the ratifiers understood 
themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time would 
have understood the words to mean. 
Bork, The Tempting of America at 143-44 (cited in note 7). 
49. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 408. 
50. ld. at 416. See id. at 408-09, 412-16 for survey of various state statutes. 
51. ld. at 418. 
52. ld. at 416. 
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that the Framer's words should be measured by the Framer's ac-
tions, rather than by their aspirations: 
the men who framed [the Declaration of Independence] were 
great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of 
honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with 
those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the 
meaning of the language they used, and how it would be under-
stood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of 
the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race .... 
They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines 
and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no 
one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were sepa-
rated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before 
established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as 
property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the 
trader were supposed to need protection.s3 
An originalism more contemptuous of fundamental values is 
scarcely imaginable. Taney found no cause for concern in the possi-
bility that originalist interpretation would make the Constitution 
unjust,s4 and he also refused to assume that the Framers wanted 
their constitutional principles to transcend the shortcomings of 
their own conduct. Had Taney adopted such an assumption, it 
would have favored construing the Framers' intention, and hence 
the Constitution, in a way consistent with justice. Instead, Taney 
made exactly the opposite assumption. He premised his interpreta-
tion on the assumption that the Framers could not have intended 
the Constitution to incorporate a standard of conduct higher than 
the one they met. 
Taney went further. He hinted that the Constitution was 
founded upon opinions that, in light of new understandings, ap-
peared unjust: "[i]t is difficult at this day to realize the state of 
public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed 
in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of 
the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution . . . 
was framed and adopted."ss For Taney, in sum, there was no rea-
son to assume that the Framers' intentions were just; no cause to 
interpret their intentions to make them as just as possible; and some 
ground for believing that their intentions were in fact unjust. 
To what extent was originalism responsible for Taney's conclu-
53. ld. at 410. 
54. ld. at 426 ("If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in 
the instrument itself by which it may be amended ... "). The full passage is quoted at text 
accompanying note 47, supra. 
55. ld. at 407. 
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sions in Scott? Taney's execution of his originalist strategy was 
clearly deficient by originalism's own standards. About that, there 
is no doubt. Taney's claim that no free blacks were citizens of any 
State when the Constitution was drafted was flatly wrong, as Justice 
Curtis pointed out.s6 Taney's review of the historical record was 
filled with errors.57 But so what? Originalism does not cease to be 
originalism when done badly. People who recommend originalism 
do so knowing that it, like any other approach, will have incompe-
tent as well as competent disciples. Indeed, if originalism is a par-
ticularly difficult strategy to carry out (because, for example, the 
historical record is ambiguous), so that poor originalist arguments 
dominate good ones, that might be a reason to discount original-
ism's value as an interpretive strategy. In any event, if Taney was 
not disingenuous-if, in other words, his result actually depended 
upon the reasoning he displayed in his opinion-then his errors are 
evidence of how originalism can contribute to injustice.ss 
Moreover, Taney's originalist argument doesn't depend upon 
those of his claims easily falsified by historical evidence of the kind 
Curtis offered. All Taney needed was the claim that the Framers 
formed the United States government on "the white basis"s9 be-
cause some of them approved of slavery and the rest either were 
racist or believed that a permanently racist Union was better than 
no Union. That claim is not easily refuted.60 Indeed, many people 
today accept Taney's reading of the Framer's intentions.6t 
One can, of course, compile evidence that cuts against Taney's 
view of the Framers. Justice Curtis expressed the conviction that 
such evidence would prove persuasive. 62 Herbert Storing, among 
56. Id. at 572· 75 (dissenting opinion). 
57. See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 340-64 (cited in note 3). 
58. Of course, Taney might have been lying: he might have invoked originalist argu-
ments, knowing them to be wrong, in order to cover up an illegitimate conclusion that he 
reached on other grounds. Even if that were so, it would not excuse originalism entirely: if 
Taney fabricated his originalism as a disguise, he must have believed that originalism pro-
vided an especially fertile set of arguments to legitimate illegitimate conclusions. Moreover, 
characterizing Taney's opinion as a lie would obviously excuse substantive due process from 
blame for Scott to exactly the same extent that it excuses originalism. 
59. The phrase belongs to Stephen Douglas, who endorsed and defended Taney's vision 
of the Founding. See Paul M. Angle, The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858 65 (U. 
of Chi. Press, 1958) ("Debates of 1858 "). 
60. At least one commentator thought Taney's erroneousness uncontroversial, how-
ever. See Corwin, 17 Am. Hist. Rev. at 67 (cited in note 12) ("Curtis's theory, it can hardly 
be doubted, was that of the framers of the Constitution"). Corwin does not identify his 
evidence. 
61. See the discussion of contemporary views in Herbert J. Storing, Slavery and the 
Moral Foundations of the American Republic ("Slavery and Moral Foundations"), in Robert 
H. Horwitz, ed., The Moral Foundations of the American Republic 214-17 (U. Press of Vir-
ginia, 2d ed. 1979) ("Moral Foundations"). 
62. Curtis wrote: 
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others, carried out the project Justice Curtis anticipated.6J The suc-
cess of any such project may depend, however, upon whether inter-
preters are willing to adopt the attitude recommended by Justice 
McLean in dissent. McLean wrote that he preferred "the lights of 
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the Consti-
tution in all its bearings, rather than to look behind that period, into 
a traffic which is now declared to be piracy, and punished with 
death by Christian nations. "64 Other interpretations are possible, 
but McLean's formulation appears to insist that we should interpret 
the Framers' intentions in the way most consistent with justice. 
McLean recommended an interpretive posture that respected the 
Framers not by-as Taney would have it-lowering their aspira-
tions to fit their conduct, but by recognizing that the Framers may 
have had aspirations (and incorporated them into the Constitution) 
without living up to them. 
We may draw two conclusions from our examination of Ta-
ney's originalism. First, Taney, unlike either McLean or Curtis, 
embraced an originalism indifferent to the justice or injustice of the 
Framers' intentions. Taney may in fact have been the original 
originalist of this sort. 6s Second, Taney's version of originalism was 
essential to the result he reached. 
Taney thus relied upon a method that anticipated the "Dred 
Again" theory's own disdain for fundamental values jurisprudence. 
Of course, nothing in the "Dred Again" argument prevents its ad-
herents from espousing a version of positivism milder than Ta-
ney's.66 We shall see, however, that some of the "Dred Again" 
My own opinion is, that a calm comparison of (the Declaration's] assertions of 
universal abstract truths, and of [the Framers'] individual opinions and acts, would 
not leave these men under any reproach of inconsistency; that the great truths they 
asserted on that solemn occasion, they were ready and anxious to make effectual, 
wherever a necessary regard to circumstances, which no statesman can disregard 
without producing more evil than good, would allow; and that it would not be just 
to them, nor true in itself, to allege that they intended to say that the Creator of all 
men had endowed the white race, exclusively, with the great natural rights which 
the Declaration of Independence asserts. But this is not the place to vindicate their 
memory. 
Scott, 60 U.S. (I 9 How.) at 574-75 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
63. Storing, Slavery and Moral Foundations, in Horwitz, ed., Moral Foundations at 217-
33 (cited in note 61). 
64. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis's argument 
bears a similar stripe insofar as it urges that the Framers be treated as statesman, who accom-
modate circumstances but do not yield to them. 
65. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 
72 Va. L. Rev. 1237, 1237-38 (1986) (" 'intentionalism' ... can be traced back at least to the 
1857 case of Scott v. Sandford"). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 945-47 (1985) (describing a transformation in original-
ism during the years preceding the Civil War). 
66. At least one has adopted such a milder version. See McConnell, 64 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. at 100 n.56 (cited in note II) (disavowing "a narrow version of originalism, under which 
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jurists have come dangerously close to replicating Taney's indiffer-
ence to justice. 67 
My third observation is that Taney's originalism-not his sub-
stantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause-was chiefly re-
sponsible for Scott's most notorious conclusions. After 
encountering the "Dred Again" comparisons between Scott and 
Roe, one might expect to find that Scott, like Roe, centered upon an 
argument about "due process of law." Not so. Taney's originalist 
argument about citizenship and personhood consumed forty-four 
percent of his opinion.6s The upshot of Taney's analysis was that 
the Court had no jurisdiction under the Diversity Clause.69 That 
conclusion, predicated on originalist reasoning and independent of 
the Due Process Clause, would have sufficed as a ground for dis-
missing Scott's suit. 
Taney followed his originalist discussion of citizenship with 
more originalist argument (equally unconvincing and almost as 
long) about the Territories ClauseJo The Due Process Clause rates 
a two-sentence mention. It occurs on the fifty-first page of Taney's 
opinion. Here are the sentences, together with the ones that pre-
cede and follow them: 
These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person, 
which it is not necessary here to enumerate, are, in express and 
positive terms, denied to the General Government; and the rights 
of private property have been guarded with equal care. Thus the 
rights of property are united with the rights of person, and 
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Consti-
tution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of 
Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his lib-
erty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and 
the meaning of a constitutional provision is determined by reference to the specific practices 
accepted at the time of ratification"); Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 
73 Cornell L. Rev. 359 (1988) (criticizing such narrow views of originalism). 
67. See text accompanying notes 111-12, infra. 
68. I am relying on Fehrenbacher's calculations. See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case at 337-40 (cited in note 3). 
69. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 427 ("the court is of opinion ... that the Circuit Court 
had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is 
erroneous"). 
70. Art. IV, Sec. 3, Para. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States"). Taney argued that this clause did not authorize Congress to govern the 
Northwest Territory. He then argued that such a power was conferred by implication in the 
clause dealing with admission of new states to the Union. Art. IV, Sec. 3, Para. I ("New 
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case at 367-76, 381-82 (cited in note 3) (summarizing and critiquing Taney's argument). 
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who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be 
dignified with the name of due process of law. 
So, too, it will hardly be contended that Congress could by 
law quarter a soldier in a house in a Territory without the con-
sent of the owner, in time of peace; nor in time of war, but in a 
manner prescribed by law.7t 
51 
Taney's opinion is thus not in any sense about the Due Process 
Clause. He did not articulate a theory of the Due Process Clause, in 
the way that he articulated, and endorsed, an originalist view of 
constitutional interpretation. There remains, however, an impor-
tant question: is Taney's substantive interpretation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause either necessary or sufficient to support his conclusions? 
If the answer were yes, that would certainly count as a ground for 
claiming that Scott was a "substantive due process" case, whatever 
else it might be. But the answer is no. 
Taney's substantive interpretation of the clause obviously was 
not necessary to his conclusion that the federal courts could grant 
Scott no relief. Taney had already reached that conclusion on juris-
dictional grounds. The due process argument might nevertheless 
have been necessary to Taney's conclusions in another respect. Ta-
ney's jurisdictional ruling was not principally responsible for the 
political shockwaves that followed Scott v. Sandford.72 The waves 
resulted instead from his conclusion that Congress had no power to 
prohibit slavery in the territories. Taney's discussion of due process 
was addressed to that topic: Taney implied that the Missouri Com-
promise, because it prohibited slavery in some federal territories, 
unconstitutionally deprived slaveholders of their property when 
they entered that territory.73 If Taney's substantive interpretation 
of "due process of law" was necessary to Taney's judgment on the 
71. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450. 
72. "Taney's ruling against Negro citizenship carried nothing like the same emotional 
charge as his ruling against the Missouri Compromise restriction." Fehrenbacher, The Dred 
Scott Case at 429 (cited in note 3). The public reaction obviously resulted from the racism of 
the era. See id. at 428-29 (comparing reaction in the white and African-American communi-
ties). Taney's opinion still would have deserved its title as the worst ever produced had he 
stopped after finishing his Diversity Clause argument. Cf. text accompanying notes 97-104, 
infra (describing Lincoln's criticism of Taney's interpretation of the Declaration of 
Independence). 
73. I say "implied" because, as Donald Fehrenbacher points out, "in spite of a general 
impression to the contrary, Taney never did specifically declare the Missouri Compromise 
restriction to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment." Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 
382 (cited in note 3). Taney said only that Congress could not deprive citizens of property 
merely because they had brought their property into a federal territory. Taney did not say 
that the Missouri Compromise displayed this defect, although one may fairly draw that infer-
ence from his argument. Fehrenbacher concludes that "Taney's contribution to the develop-
ment of substantive due process was therefore meager and somewhat obscure." Id. 
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Missouri Compromise, we could at least say that it was necessary to 
one of his more notorious conclusions. 
The Property Clause argument appears, however, to have been 
no more than one among multiple grounds for Taney's conclusion 
that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. Taney embed-
ded the due process argument in a lengthy discussion about whether 
the Constitution delegated Congress any power to regulate slavery 
in the Territories. Although Taney left this argument in order to 
make his reference to the Due Process Clause, later sentences ap-
pear to resume the arguments construing congressional power nar-
rowly. Taney's position is anything but clear, but he apparently 
concluded that Congress had no constitutional authority to regulate 
slavery in the territories. 74 If that is correct, then the argument that 
the Property Clause precluded Congress from banning slavery was 
superfluous, because Taney found that the Constitution did not 
delegate to Congress the power to regulate slavery. 
Nevertheless, Taney's argument to the effect that Congress 
lacked authority to regulate slavery in the territories is muddled. 
One might accordingly say that he needed the substantive interpre-
tation of the Due Process Clause in order to conclude that Congress 
could not prohibit slavery in the territories.7s That is not my view, 
but reasonable people may differ about the point. 76 
When we tum from the argument's necessity to its sufficiency, 
we can answer with more confidence. Taney's interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause as a source of substantive rights is not sufficient 
to defeat Scott's claim or to invalidate the Missouri Compromise. 
The reason is important: Taney's interpretation of "property" 
rested upon his originalist denial that African-Americans were per-
sons within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Sotirios Barber has made this point clearly: 
[One need not be] opposed to the abstract proposition that 
Congress should respect the property rights of persons who move 
74. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452. 
75. See, e.g., the dissent of Justice Curtis, id. at 623 (the majority's arguments find no 
constitutional limit upon Congressional discretion with respect to Territorial government 
"save those positive prohibitions to legislate, which are found in the Constitution"). 
76. Fehrenbacher asks whether Taney intended to rest Scott on the Due Process Clause, 
and answers in the following way: 
If so, it is strange that he should have been so unexplicit about it. For, in spite of a 
general impression to the contrary, Taney never did specifically declare the_ Mis-
souri Compromise restriction to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. He dtd not 
even say in his conclusion that it was "forbidden" by the Constitution. Instead, he 
merely held that it was "not warranted by the Constitution," thus ending on a 
vague note of strict construction. 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 382 (cited in note 3). 
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from one place to another. What is regrettable in Dred Scott is 
the additional proposition that Congress has a duty fully to re-
spect property in human beings. That Congress should respect 
property is one proposition; that the law either has or can legiti-
mately make human beings ordinary pieces of property is quite 
another. Everything in Dred Scott turns on Taney's affirmative 
answer to the latter, an answer he pretended to believe was a 
clear mandate of the American founding. 77 
53 
A substantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause, in other 
words, gets Taney nowhere until coupled with an obnoxious con-
ception of property, which recognizes property in persons. As Bar-
ber points out, Taney derived that conception of property from an 
originalist argument. Indeed, we can readily appreciate how Ta-
ney's argument about citizenship provided a foundation for the the-
ory of property he needed: having already decided that the 
Constitution contemplated African-Americans only as property and 
not as people protected by the Constitution, Taney could affirm that 
the Constitution recognized no reason for treating African-Ameri-
can slaves differently from other property. That is exactly the path 
he pursued. 
Shortly after his two-sentence reference to due process, Taney 
devoted two paragraphs to defending a positivist theory of property 
rights.7s Although he acknowledged that international law distin-
guished slavery from other forms of property, Taney refused to rec-
ognize this distinction when construing the Constitution. 79 He 
referred to "an earlier part" of his opinion, which had concluded 
that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly af-
firmed in the Constitution. "so Taney was not so kind as to supply a 
supra cite to the passage he had in mind. The only plausible candi-
date is a discussion of the Importation and Fugitive Slave Clauses, a 
discussion contained within Taney's interpretation of citizenship.s1 
77. Sotirios A. Barber, Whither Moral Realism in Constitutional Theory? A Reply to 
Professor McConnell, 64 Chi-Kent L. Rev. Ill, 126-27 (1988). 
78. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451. 
79. Taney premised his refusal on legal positivism: 
it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people 
of the United States and their Government .... The powers of the Government, 
and the rights of citizen under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly writ-
ten down .... And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master 
in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other 
property owned by a citizen, no tribunal ... has a right to draw such a distinction 
Id. at 451. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 410-12. This passage is the only one in which Taney used a textual argument 
to justify his claim that African-Americans were property. In the course of the passage, 
Taney said that "[t]he unhappy black race were ... never thought of or spoken of except as 
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The passage follows immediately after Taney's interpretive axiom, 
quoted earlier, making the Framers' intentions dependent upon 
their conduct. Taney's originalism is the crucial basis for his inter-
pretation of the two clauses, and thus also for his assertion that the 
"the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed" 
by means of two provisions which speak only of persons and never 
mention slavery or, for that matter, property.s2 Taney thus owed 
his construction of the Property Clause to originalism, and perhaps 
to his endorsement of an originalism indifferent to justice. 
So much for Taney. My fourth observation is that the Scott 
dissents invoked fundamental values jurisprudence to rebuke Taney 
for his interpretation of the Due Process Clause. The "Dred Again" 
school paints the dissenters quite differently, treating them-and es-
pecially Justice Curtis-as glorious knights of positivism. Members 
of the "Dred Again" school claim to be the true heirs of these 
jurists. 
If the "Dred Again" school's rendering were a fair one, we 
would expect the Scott dissents to include something like the mod-
ern positivist criticism of substantive due process. That criticism 
maintains either that the Due Process Clause by its terms limits its 
protection to procedural rights, or that the Framers never intended, 
as a matter of historical fact, that the Clause would encompass sub-
stantive elements. The criticism accepts such textual and historical 
arguments as dispositive evidence against a substantive reading of 
either the Property Clause or the Liberty Clause.s3 
Justice Curtis's dissent does indeed contain an argument of this 
sort. He wrote: 
Nor, in my judgment, will the position, that a prohibition to 
bring slaves into a Territory deprives any one of his property 
without due process of law, bear examination. 
It must be remembered that this restriction on the legislative 
power is not peculiar to the Constitution of the United States; it 
property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need 
protection," id. at 410; that in the Importation Clause, "the right to purchase and hold this 
property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty years by the people who framed the 
Constitution," id. at 411; and that the Fugitive Slave Clause pledged "to maintain and uphold 
the right of the master in the manner specified, as long as the Government they then formed 
should endure." Id. 
82. Compare id. at 451 ("the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly 
affirmed in the Constitution") with id. at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (one may infer from the 
Fugitive Slave Clause that the Constitution treats slavery as unfounded in common law and 
inconsistent with natural law) and Angle, Debates of 1858 at 385 (cited in note 59) (Lincoln's 
argument that constitutional language manifests "that the fathers of the government expected 
and intended the institution of slavery to come to an end"). 
83. Both arguments appear in quick succession in Bork, The Tempting of America at 32 
(cited in note 7). 
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was borrowed from Magna Charta; was brought to America by 
our ancestors, as part of their inherited liberties, and has existed 
in all the States, usually in the very words of the great charter. It 
existed in every political community in America in 1787, when 
the ordinance prohibiting slavery north and west of the Ohio was 
passed.B4 
55 
Curtis then surveyed a variety of state laws depriving slaveholders 
of their rights over slaves. He pointed out that nobody had ever 
objected to these laws on the ground that they were inconsistent 
with Magna Charta. 
This looks a great deal like a pure originalist argument. Cur-
tis's argument collected evidence that, in the years preceding the 
Founding, nobody challenged statutes prohibiting slavery on the 
ground that these statutes were inconsistent with Magna Charta. 
From this evidence, he inferred that the Framers believed Magna 
Charta permitted whatever deprivations such statutes effected. His 
argument maintained that, because the Constitution borrows the 
language of the Due Process Clause from Magna Charta, the Fram-
ers probably believed that statutes consistent with Magna Charta 
were likewise consistent with the Due Process Clause. The pure 
originalist argument would then conclude that these beliefs about 
the Clause's application were dispositive. 
We must, however, distinguish the pure originalist argument 
from Curtis's because Curtis never quite closed the loop in Scott. 
He did not say, for example, that the Due Process Clause could not 
have an application different from that of Magna Charta, nor did he 
say that the constructions the Framers put on Magna Charta were 
dispositive as to its meaning.ss Indeed, he expressly skirted the lat-
ter question by saying, "I think I may at least say, if the Congress 
84. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 626-27 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
85. Curtis did sometimes use intentionalist rhetoric. See, e.g., id. at 625 ("Is it not more 
rational to conclude that they who framed and adopted the Constitution were aware that 
persons held to service under the laws of a State are property only to the extent and under the 
conditions fixed by those laws ... and having empowered Congress to make all needful rules 
and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, it was their intention to leave to 
the discretion of Congress what regulations, if any, should be made concerning slavery 
therein?"). The idea of intention is, however, not doing much work here: Curtis is imputing 
to the Framers, and thereby to the Constitution, the view that it would be more "rational" to 
hold. 
On the other hand, Curtis had used more forceful language when construing the Due 
Process Clause in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272 (1855). There, Curtis had said that the "words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly 
intended to have the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land' in Magna Chana." 
ld. at 276. Curtis continued: 
To what principles ... are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by 
congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine 
the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provi-
56 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:37 
did then violate Magna Charta by the ordinance, no one discovered 
that violation."s6 Curtis thus implicitly demanded that Taney ex-
plain why so many reasonable and intelligent people were mistaken 
about Magna Charta's application. It would, of course, be reason-
able to ask that question even if the mistakes made by those people 
were not in any way binding upon the future. 
Moreover, Curtis did not say that the Due Process Clause pro-
tected no substantive rights, nor did he make a favorite argument of 
positivists today, namely, that the inclusion of the word "process" 
in the Due Process Clause rules out, as a simple textual matter, the 
possibility that the Clause protects substantive liberties. Still, if the 
passage now under discussion were the whole of Curtis's answer to 
Taney's due process argument, then I would have to concede that 
"Dred Again's" picture renders Curtis more faithfully than it does 
Taney. The passage at least provides some basis for designating 
Curtis a "positivist/originalist/process-means-process" Justice. 
But the reference to Magna Charta is not the whole story. 
Here is the way Curtis began his attack on Taney's Property 
Clause argument: 
I will now proceed to examine the question, whether this clause 
is entitled to the effect thus attributed to it. It is necessary, first, 
to have a clear view of the nature and incidents of that particular 
species of property which is now in question. 
Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by 
municipal law. This is not only plain in itself, and agreed by all 
writers on this subject, but is inferable from the Constitution, 
and has been explicitly declared by this court. The Constitution 
refers to slaves as "persons held to service in one State, under the 
laws thereof." Nothing can more clearly describe a status cre-
ated by municipal law. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, (10 Pet., 611,) 
this court said: "The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere 
municipal regulation, founded on and limited to the range of ter-
ritoriallaws."B7 
Property in slaves is different from other property because slavery is 
"contrary to natural right." Curtis went on to conclude that, for 
sions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England .... 
Id. at 275-76. One might observe in connection with these passages that Murray's Lessee 
involved a procedural issue, and so did not compel Curtis to consider whether the Clause 
might have substantive applications. Nor does insisting upon English practice as a source of 
the Clause's meaning rule out recourse to other sources in appropriate circumstances. Never-
theless, there is no gainsaying that Curtis's comments in Murray's Lessee "close the loop" of 
the positivist argument to a greater extent than do his arguments in Scott. 
86. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 627. 
87. I d. at 624. 
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this reason, it would be unreasonable to construe the Constitution 
to protect these property rights when the slaveholder allowed the 
slave to leave the jurisdiction that had created the rights.ss 
In light of the astonishing claims made by "Dred Again" theo-
rists, the obvious bears mention: this is an argument about natural 
rights. Curtis claimed that the Fugitive Slave Clause incorporated a 
distinction between natural and positive rights, and he claimed that 
one must appreciate that distinction to understand the word "prop-
erty" in the Due Process Clause. Today we would probably frame 
the argument in terms of fundamental values or simple justice, but 
the point would be the same. To understand the constitutional text, 
one must study justice. 
This is Curtis's first and most extended argument against Ta-
ney's substantive reading of the Property Clause. It is also Mc-
Lean's only argument against that reading.s9 Nevertheless, Curtis's 
second argument has clear originalist overtones, and it would be 
silly to claim that his first natural rights argument was more impor-
tant simply because he put it first, or because he gave it more text. 
On the other hand, it would be even sillier to claim that only Cur-
tis's second, originalist argument mattered. For that reason, we can 
say at least this: fundamental values jurisprudence deserves some 
credit for the Scott dissents (including Justice Curtis's dissent). 
We must consider one final piece of evidence before we can 
judge "Dred Again's" rendering of Curtis. The "Dred Again" theo-
rists are fond of quoting Curtis's summary of his own method, 
which they take to be a repudiation of even responsible forms of 
fundamental values jurisprudence. Here is what Curtis said: 
To engraft on any instrument a substantive exception not found 
in it, must be admitted to be a matter attended with great diffi-
culty. And the difficulty increases with the importance of the 
instrument, and the magnitude and complexity of the interests 
involved in its construction. To allow this to be done with the 
Constitution, upon reasons purely political, renders its judicial 
interpretation impossible-because judicial tribunals, as such, 
cannot decide on political considerations. Political reasons have 
not the requisite certainty to afford rules of juridical interpreta-
tion. They are different in different men. They are different in 
the same men at different times. And when a strict interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which gov-
ern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical 
opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we 
have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of 
88. ld. at 625-26. 
89. ld. at 547-50 (dissenting opinion). 
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individual men, who for the time being have power to declare 
what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it 
ought to mean.90 
We should not be surprised that positivists would warm to this pas-
sage, with its embrace of "strict interpretation" and "fixed rules;" 
its condemnation of "political reasons" and "theoretical opinions;" 
and its warning that other modes of interpretation allow wanton 
judges to hide "what the Constitution is" under "their own views of 
what it ought to mean." But we should be careful. Before conced-
ing that Curtis was-in the methodology he professed, if not in the 
method he employed-a precursor to today's "Dred Again" theo-
rists, we should examine an ambiguity in his statement. What did 
Curtis mean when he referred to "the fixed rules which govern the 
interpretation of laws"? 
As G. Edward White has shown, antebellum constitutional 
theory embraced some rather controversial, and substantive, 
precepts under the heading, "rules of interpretation."9I Curtis ad-
ded the requirement that these rules be "fixed." Nothing in his 
opinion enables us to be certain about how Curtis understood this 
phrase.92 There is, however, an interesting possibility consistent 
with what Curtis said in Scott. Curtis might have considered a rule 
of interpretation to be fixed if it enjoyed the consent of the legal 
community. We have already seen him refer to one such rule, a rule 
which, he said, was "agreed by all writers on the subject." The rule 
is that "[s]lavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by 
municipal law."93 Taney had recognized the existence of a long-
90. ld. at 620-21. Curtis offered this passage after noting that counsel for both sides 
had neglected the text when arguing the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise: "No 
particular clause of the Constitution has been referred to at the bar in support of either of 
these views." ld. at 620. 
91. G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-35, in 3 History 
of the Supreme Coun of the United States 114-19 (Macmillan, 1988) (discussing how Joseph 
Story could describe nineteen propositions "consistent with an ideological perspective" as 
"rules of interpretation" supplying a "fixed standard" for judicial review). 
92. Curtis made reference to "settled rules" in Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 
283. The settled rules he stated there included, for example, the proposition that "a public 
agent, who acts pursuant to the command of a legal precept .... cannot be made responsible 
in a judicial tribunal for obeying the lawful command of the government; and the government 
itself, which gave the command, cannot be sued without its own consent." I d. Although 
Curtis gave two paragraphs worth of such rules (unaccompanied by citation), it is difficult to 
infer from the passage the criteria Curtis used to distinguish "settled rules" from other juris-
prudential reasons. 
93. See text accompanying note 87. The rule described by Curtis had its most famous 
articulation in Somerset's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials I, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772), where 
Lord Mansfield said, "[t]he state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons ... but only [by] positive law .... it's so odious, that nothing can 
be suffered to support it, but positive law." 20 Howell's State Trials at 82, 98 Eng. Rep. at 
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standing legal rule distinguishing between mere municipal regula-
tions and laws consistent with natural right, but had refused, on 
originalist grounds,94 to allow this "fixed rule" to "govern the inter-
pretation" of the Constitution. Curtis's argument about municipal 
law was a response to Taney's rejection of the distinction. We thus 
arrive at a hypothesis: in the passage the positivists so admire, Cur-
tis might have meant, inter alia, to defend reasonable recourse to 
natural right against a rampant positivism that rejected any such 
reference. Indeed, there is a sense in which positivism is a decidedly 
political doctrine, because it permits a dominant opinion to deter-
mine what is law without recourse to any "fixed" standard, such as 
justice or natural right. 
There are a lot of "maybe's" in the argument just completed. 
Moreover, Curtis's statement has a positivist ring to it. We can, 
however, make two modest claims about what Curtis said. First, 
the complexion of Curtis's statement changes when one knows that 
he issued it in dissent from an originalist opinion. Curtis must have 
recognized that arguments about original intent, no less than argu-
ments about fundamental values, can be "purely political." Second, 
Curtis, unlike Taney, never expressed indifference to the possibility 
that his theory of interpretation would construe the law in a way 
that made the law unjust. Curtis's theory of constitutional interpre-
tation is thus ambiguous in its positivism. His practice, as we have 
seen, was unambiguously respectful of fundamental values. 
One observation remains. Justice Scalia implies in Casey that 
Casey resembles Scott because the two will provoke a similar public 
reaction. Perhaps an examination of extra-judicial sources would 
show that thoughtful antebellum critics of Scott regarded Taney's 
substantive reading of the Due Process Clause as the essence of his 
decision, and believed, too, that this reading depended upon a rejec-
510. For discussion, see Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Pro-
cess 16-17, 29 (Yale U. Press, 1975) ("Justice Accused"). 
The concept of "municipal law" itself reflected a number of legal axioms. Blackstone 
defined "municipal law" as a "rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a 
state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." William Blackstone, I 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 44 (Rees Welsh & Co., 1902). He contrasted it with 
natural law and revealed Jaw, id. at 42-43, 54-55, saying that "no human Jaws should be 
suffered to contradict these." ld. at 42. 
Joseph Story's use of the term probably fits better with Curtis's. Story distinguished 
"municipal regulations" from other laws on the ground that they aimed at "private or local 
convenience" rather than the "public good." Joseph Story, I Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States at section 421 (Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833). Story authored the 
Court's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), which Curtis quotes 
with approval. See text accompanying note 87. I have elsewhere discussed Story's use of 
natural law in Prigg, including his distinction between municipal regulations and other laws. 
Eisgruber, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273, 280, 322-23 (cited in note 38). 
94. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451. See text accompanying notes 78-82, supra. 
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tion of positivism or originalism. If so, that would provide a rea-
son-albeit a rather weak one-for accepting the "Dred Again" 
theory's picture of Scott. We could at least say that the public be-
lieved Taney had breached judicial duty by improperly construing 
the phrase "due process of law," even if the pro-slavery effect of his 
decision proceeded from other errors and even if the Scott dissenters 
did not pursue this point as forcefully as they might have. Does the 
record allow the "Dred Again" theorists to make this claim? 
Unlike the previous questions we have taken up, this one re-
quires an examination of the historical record beyond the Scott 
opinions themselves. A brief review of secondary sources suggests 
that criticism of Scott took a different course from the one the 
"Dred Again" theory would have us expect. Many Republicans 
and abolitionists attacked the decision as political rather than judi-
cial, but based this charge upon the claim that Taney's assessment 
of the Missouri Compromise was dicta.9s These critics argued that 
once Taney had decided that Scott was not a citizen, and so could 
not sue, Taney lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. 
That is indeed a kind of argument against political judging, but it is 
not the kind that the "Dred Again" theorists wish to make. The 
"Dred Again" theorists have an argument about the merits of Ta-
ney's ruling, not about his decision to reach the merits. 
Of course, the most important antebellum critique of Scott, 
Abraham Lincoln's, did focus upon the merits of Taney's decision. 
One of Lincoln's principal complaints about the opinion was that it 
decided that taking a slave "into a United States territory where 
slavery was prohibited by act of Congress, did not make him free 
because that act of Congress as they held was unconstitutional."96 
Taney's substantive reading of the Due Process Clause is a compo-
nent of his attack on the Missouri Compromise. May we conclude 
that, at least for this eminent critic of Scott, the interpretation of 
"due process" was the core of the decision's turpitude? 
Three reasons compel us to say otherwise. First, as we have 
already seen, Taney's application of the Property Clause to the Mis-
souri Compromise depends upon his originalist claim that property 
95. See Potter, Impending Crisis at 281 (cited in note 34) ("as the argument against the 
decision developed, it took the form, above all, of an elaboration of the statement in Justice 
Curtis's dissent, that in dealing with the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, the 
Court had taken up a question which was not properly before it"); id. at 283 ("The real 
problem for historians-widely overlooked-is not whether Taney's opinion was dictum, but 
why the question of dictum has been blown up to such vast proportions and has overshad-
owed the discussion of all other aspects of the case."). See also Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case 417-48 (cited in note 3) (summarizing criticisms); Charles Warren, 3 The Supreme 
Court in United States History 24-40 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1922) (same). 
96. Angle, Debates of 1858 at 377 (cited in note 59). 
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in persons is, for constitutional purposes, no different from any 
other kind of property. 
Second, Lincoln singled out Taney's originalist conclusions for 
special censure. According to Lincoln, Scott laid the foundation for 
nationalizing slavery because it declared that "[t]he right of property 
in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution/"97 
This proposition is the prerequisite for Taney's application of due 
process, not a consequence of it. Taney instead plucked the propo-
sition from his originalist theory of citizenship. Lincoln took 
equally vigorous exception to Taney's orginalist argument exclud-
ing African-Americans from the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence. 98 
Third, Lincoln did not object to Scott because it was inconsis-
tent with a positivist respect for democratic processes. On the con-
trary, he excoriated the decision because it corroded moral 
principles implicit in the Constitution and explicit in the Declara-
tion of Independence. Lincoln said that "a vast portion of the 
American people .... look upon [slavery] as a vast moral evil."99 
He thought it important that Americans could "prove it as such by 
the writings of those who gave us the blessings of liberty which we 
enjoy."Ioo The Framers' judgment was evident from the language 
of the Constitution, which affixed "many clear marks of disapproba-
tion" upon slavery.IOI The most troubling defect in Scott was its 
inconsistency with the principles of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.I02 Lincoln urged opposition to Scott "because we think it 
lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what 
we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil 
into the states themselves."I03 Lincoln's constitutional interpreta-
tion thus was originalist, but his, by contrast to Taney's, was an 
originalism steeped in justice.I04 
97. ld. at 308 (quoting Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451). According to Lincoln, the 
essence of Scott was compressed into the single sentence he quoted. Id. 
98. ld. at 380 ("three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to ... 
[assert that the Declaration of Independence] did not include the negro. I believe the first 
man who ever said it was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was 
our friend Stephen A. Douglas"). 
99. ld. at 35 (Lincoln's speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858). 
100. ld. 
101. ld. at 386 (Lincoln's reply at the Alton debate, October 15, 1858). 
102. Id. at 41. See also Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another 
Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 67, 68-69 (1988) (discussing Lincoln's objections 
to Taney's reading of the Declaration). 
103. Angle, Debates of 1858 at 333 (cited in note 59). 
104. See, e.g., id. at 100-01 (Americans should heed the Framers because "(t]hey erected 
a beacon to guide their children and their children's children, and the countless myriads who 
should inhabit the earth in other ages"). 
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To summarize, insofar as Republicans and abolitionists de-
nounced the decision as political, they did so for reasons irrelevant 
to the merits of Taney's interpretation of the Due Process Clause. 
Lincoln's criticism of Scott emphasized the importance of constru-
ing the Constitution in a way consistent with moral principle. We 
thus arrive at a fifth and final observation: public condemnation of 
Scott appears to have accused Taney of injustice, not infidelity to 
positivism. 
IV. DRED NOT 
By putting these five points together, we arrive at a picture 
quite unlike the one presupposed by the "Dred Again" argument. 
Scott v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade interpret different segments of 
constitutional text. The crucial question in Scott was whether per-
sons can be "property" within the meaning of the Constitution, a 
question which obviously does not arise in Roe. Taney answered 
that question by means of a dogmatic originalism, which expressly 
recognized that originalism might lead to unjust results. Taney's 
application of originalism to the word "property" was the engine of 
Scott's pro-slavery doctrine. It is therefore wrong to portray Ta-
ney's opinion in Scott as an example of the risks entailed by funda-
mental values jurisprudence. Both Curtis and McLean opposed 
Taney's originalism on grounds that implicated natural law. Cur-
tis's methodological credo is not inconsistent with that approach. It 
is therefore wrong to depict Curtis or McLean as pure positivists. 
Finally, we found no evidence to suggest that public condemnation 
of Scott depended upon positivism. On the contrary, the most fa-
mous and important critique of the decision, Lincoln's, condemned 
it in a way that sounds in fundamental values (or simple justice or 
natural law). 
These conclusions should make clear that, even if the "Dorian 
Gray Theory of Constitutional Jurisprudence" is true, the Casey 
plurality nevertheless need not fear for its portraits. I have already 
hinted, however, that other portraits might be in jeopardy. Those 
gladdened by the defense of the Casey and Roe majorities may no-
tice a tempting opportunity to turn the tables. The restored render-
ing of Scott suggests that Taney's jurisprudence bears the following 
hallmarks: it is originalist, and it respects property no less than 
liberty. One might seize upon these features of Taney's jurispru-
dence to point a finger at originalists who defend property rights. 
The argument would have us believe that such jurists are giving us 
Dred Again. That would be a bad argument, however. It rests 
upon the same non-sequitur that the Dred Again theory does. 
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Searching for Taney's heir in this way would amount to a witch 
hunt, not responsible academic criticism. 10s 
Indeed, in spite all of the ink that has been spilled in the battle 
between originalism and fundamental values, they are in important 
respects two paths to the same goal. American government aspires 
to be both democratic and just. To insist that justice and democ-
racy coincide makes heavy but, we may hope, not impossible de-
mands upon the American people. Until evidence forces us to give 
up the hope for a just democracy, the constitutional enterprise com-
pels us to treat that hope as reasonable.I06 Originalism runs amok 
when it denies that justice can teach us about the mind of the peo-
ple; fundamental values jurisprudence goes awry when it denies that 
the acts of the people may be a guide to justice. 101 I think that 
Taney made originalism's version of that error, not the fundamental 
values version, but it does not follow either that originalism caused 
the mistake, or that fundamental values jurisprudence could not 
make a similar mistake. That is not to say that differences between 
the paths pursued by originalism and fundamental values don't 
matter. The differences matter a great deal when it comes to select-
ing the best interpretation of the Constitution. 10s But the distinc-
tion between originalism and fundamental values matters very little 
if one cares only about avoiding the worst interpretation of the Con-
stitution-about, in other words, avoiding future Scott v. Sandfords. 
These observations bring us, however, to a second way in 
which we might identify Taney's successors. Taney did not simply 
embrace originalism; he pledged himself to a form of originalism 
that declared its independence from justice. In doing so, he sepa-
105. Indeed, Bork complains that Senator Simon treated him unfairly by noting a resem-
blance between Bork's method and Taney's. Bork, The Tempting of America at 301 (cited in 
note 7). One can sympathize both with Senator Simon's impression and Judge Bork's 
reaction. 
106. See Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 836, 
845 (1988) ("Publius believes the case for popular government depends on its reconciliation 
to objective standards."). 
107. I explore the themes of this paragraph in two articles: Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is 
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. - (1992) (constitutional 
interpretation is a means for inspiring cultural adherence to constitutional principle); Christo-
pher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text (forthcoming 1993) (constitutional interpretation is a 
guide to what justice requires in light of the constraints imposed by American political 
beliefs). 
108. This essay takes no position, for example, about the extent to which judges should 
abstain from interfering with majoritarian political processes. Questions about the appropri-
ate scope of judicial restraint will be resolved only by choosing the best interpretation of the 
Constitution, not by mere attempts to avoid the worst interpretation. The problem of select-
ing the best interpretation will include, among other problems, that of identifying the relative 
weight due moral and institutional norms. Cf. Cover, Justice Accused at 197-238 (cited in 
note 93) (discussing these problems in connection with American slavery cases). 
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rated democracy from justice and chose the former.t09 He then 
used his amoral jurisprudence to render an immoral decision. We 
can only speculate as to the motives for Taney's choices. There is, 
however, reason to believe that Taney may have wanted to protect 
slave institutions. Fehrenbacher has written that Taney's opinion is 
"not only a statement of southern assumptions and arguments but 
also an expression of the southern mood-fearful, angry, and defi-
ant-in the late stages of national crisis."tto If Taney had unjust 
intentions, he would have had an obvious reason to adopt a juris-
prudence indifferent to justice: justice would have been an obstacle 
to his plans. 
Casey's critics certainly have no comparable reason to invite 
injustice. Some of them adhere, however, to a professional credo 
that mimics Taney's indifference to injustice. Judge Bork, for ex-
ample, proudly proclaims early in his book that judges should be 
concerned with law, not justice, and that they should guard the dis-
tinction between the two.ttt Justice Scalia's opinion in Casey de-
clares, quite implausibly, that constitutional interpretation depends 
neither upon reasoned judgment nor upon personal conviction.112 
There is no good reason for originalists to insist, as both Judge Bork 
and Justice Scalia seem eager to do, that originalist interpretation is 
not a way of knowing justice. 
The surest way to besmirch the image one leaves to posterity is 
to commit immoral acts. That was Roger Taney's problem, and, 
for that matter, Dorian Gray's. As I have already said, Casey's crit-
ics, unlike Taney, have no reason to bring about the injustice which 
109. The historian David Potter made this point eloquently: "the Dred Scott decision 
was a failure because the justices followed a narrow legalism which led them into the untena-
ble position of pitting the Constitution against basic American values, although the Constitu-
tion in fact derives its strength from its embodiment of American values." Potter, Impending 
Crisis at 292 (cited in note 34). 
110. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 337 (cited in note 3). See also note 13, supra. 
Ill. Bork, The Tempting of America at 6 (cited in note 7). 
112. Justice Scalia says that the Casey plurality exemplifies "a new mode of constitu-
tional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, but 
upon what the Court calls 'reasoned judgment,' ... which turns out to be nothing but philo-
sophical predilection and moral intuition." 112 S. Ct. at 2886, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4841. Scalia 
adds: 
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing 
essentially lawyers' work up here-reading text and discerning our society's tradi-
tional understanding of that text-the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and 
traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. But if in reality 
our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily in making value judg-
ments ... then a free and intelligent people's attitude towards us can be expected to 
be (ought to be) quite different. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 
1798 (1991) ("the central theme of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is that justice is not his 
business."). 
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their jurisprudence, no less than Taney's, condones. Sheer human 
decency,IIJ or simple good luck, will likely save them from Taney's 
fate. Yet, if their portraits do remain untarnished, positivist dogma 
will deserve none of the credit. 
113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849, 
864 (1989) (endorsing originalism, but "hasten[ing] to confess that in a crunch I may prove a 
faint-hearted originalist"). 
